Israel invaded Gaza and South Lebanon in 2006; waged a savage war over a couple of Israeli privates taken into custody by Hamas/Hezbolleh in Israel’s front lines. Big powers and UN involvement internationalized the issue.

 

 

In stark contrast Sri Lanka (SL) took captives over 1000 Indian (Tamil) fishermen and 250 fishing boats in Indian waters. Except for protests in TN; not a whimper from Delhi a nation aspiring for a regional power role forged through Narayanan’s India/US/Israel/Sri Lanka axis vision. The much hailed apologists' axis strategic thinking for an India’s regional leadership received prompt snub from SL though the TN fishermen’s issue. Delhi's  craving to appease SL at any cost drives its passivity even in the face of such a major military adventure on India by SL. Does Delhi’s cooling off of interest in the Tamil cause and TN sensitivities also extend to ignoring TN sensitivities when TN and its fishermen are subjected to SL aggression and TN fishermen (aren’t they Indians) are captured, interrogated and held captives in a foreign soil? India’s inaction means in effect delivering to SL an Israel style role in regional security in India’s soft underbelly on a platter. TN is in this soft underbelly and the fishermen’s issue proves TN’s vulnerability and Delhi’s indifference to TN’s plight.  

 

 

Thus on the TN fishermen’s issue SL created a precedent setting role in characteristic Israeli style. India paradoxically shied away from protesting leave alone providing armed protection to its citizens (the TN fishermen and their assets – the fishing boats).  Leaked reports claim that Narayanan raised the Indian fishermen at the recent Colombo conference behind closed doors; and no communiqué was issued after the conference. That SL acted on this scale within a week of the conference raises questions on whether the fishermen’s plight was ever raised at the Colombo meeting. The leaked reports were possibly for the consumption in India and elsewhere. Would such leaked reports satisfy TN, mainstream Tamils and its fishermen victims? Only an India emboldened SL would embark on an action/war on this scale capturing not a few but a thousand Indians (fishermen) and Indian assets (fishing vessels). Such an operation required planning (it was planned strangely when Narayanan was in the conference in Colombo with key persons who were directing the operation) and the assembling of a flotilla large enough to ensure a speedy and successful outcome for SL. Did the Indian intelligence and Indian navy fail here badly? In effect SL action went beyond ignoring the Indian concerns as delivered at the Colombo conference. It was meant to serve as a prompt and stern rejection of concerns India expressed over the fishermen’s issue. SL delivered its response to Narayanan's message forcefully and in stern warlike Israeli style. Quo Vadis Narayanan’s India/US/Israeli/SL axis and Indian regional power role ambitions?

 

That Indian inaction (verbal/diplomatic/military) over this issue is the logical extension of India’s recent SL policies is analysed in V S Subramaniam’s piece ‘THREAT TO INDIA’S SOFT UNDERBELLY’ 30 May 2008 in this website. This article developed Anil Athale’s theme in his ‘Lanka Turmoil’ Rediff of 11 January 2008 highlighting the meekness, helplessness and paralysis that afflicts post Rajiv era SL policy. Since the Rajiv/JR 1987 deal from which India is still unable to extricate itself from, Delhi Congress regimes unlike non-Congress regimes remain saddled with those commitments to SL.  Hence the continuation of Indian pro-SL genocide stance commenced with Rajiv’s and RAW’s role fomenting inter-group rivalries and killings (to demonise the Tamil resistance), Rajiv’s unethical 1987 ‘kill Prabaharan’ order, engineered dismissal of the TN government and after 2004 Natwar Singh lobbying with EU to list the Tamil resistance/LTTE ‘terrorist’, supplying SL intelligence, weapons and funds for their purchase, voting for SL (a flagrant HR abuser) for a seat in the UNHRC. Evidence of these is in General Harkirat’s book. In effect Delhi continues with Rajiv’s failed IPKF policies disavowed by all concerned parties as clumsy and detrimental to peace in the region.

 

 

Reference is constantly made to the Tamil Nadu factor when Indo-SL relations are discussed. Events have proved that this has no substance; it is a mere mantra. To have substance a unified Delhi-Chennai approach to SL is a must. This is sadly missing. In comparison to the anti-Tamil cause measures of the Congress led Delhi listed in the preceding paragraph the BJP led rule caused the least harm to the Tamil cause. Please see ‘THE TAMIL CAUSE BETTER SERVED – UNDER A CONGRESS OR BJP LED COALITION’ in this website June 24 2008. During this Congress Delhi period SL policy was made to look muddled deliberately to disguise its support for SL’s genocide on Tamils. TN Tamils suffered from excessive intrusive surveillance on its pro-resistance activities. It is only the coalition polity logjam that holds the Delhi – Chennai coalition together. The poor state of Delhi-Chennai relations is unlikely to sustain for long the Congress led Delhi coalition pre or post elections.

 

 

The performance of the Congress Delhi on the fishermen’s plight will be the acid test on the substance in the TN factor. SL apologists claim that TN Tamils may overlook Delhi over-appeasing SL over the Tamil resistance/LTTE. But would they when fellow Indians (TN fishermen) are subject to POW humiliation in SL. The longer it takes for Delhi to obtain the release of the TN fishermen Delhi’s concern for TN Tamils will show-up to be shallow. Memories of SL’s animosity towards India amongst the generality of Indians will resurface to curtail SL Israeli style role in India’s soft underbelly. Delhi leadership acted so meekly that TN chief Minister had to write to Delhi calling on it to act on this issue.

 

 

 

An SL apology for its action is in order. Compensation for distress and other loss needs to be vigorously pursued with SL. TN fishermen and TN have to consider fall-back arrangements to overcome intelligence and Navy failures to prevent similar SL attacks in the future. Chennai may consider extricating itself from its partnership with an unreliable Delhi Congress before the forthcoming elections. Erratic and queer changes are a feature of coalition polity in India that unless Congress Delhi sets limits on its Buddhist/Sinhala appeasement, mainstream Tamils in TN and Indians as a whole are unlikely to remain passive. Preventing permanent alienation of the mainstream Tamils becomes most critical for Indian Union. Congress Delhi’s energies need to be directed at nurturing unity within the Indian Union above everything else be they deal/money politics and contrived excuses like keeping India’s regional leadership role intact by keeping out phony foreign powers gaining a foothold in the region. The latter thesis emphasizes its excuse character in the context of SL’s strong track record in undermining India’s leadership role over the past half a century.

 

In view of the above the following quote from ‘THREAT TO INDIA’S SOFT UNDERBELLY’ 30 May 2008 veluppillai.sulekha.com blog has some relevance.

‘One could postulate that Anil Athale’s ‘India soft underbelly’ from a historical perspective refers to Sri Lanka (SL) emerging role as an Israeli like ‘genie’ that turned the Middle East into the world’s hottest spot. A rearmed SL (thanks to Congress Delhi’s recent contribution in this direction) also has the potential to extend the conflict beyond its boundaries to engulf the region, specifically TN that is in the front line. How reliable will be the Congress Delhi’s protective umbrella to a vulnerable TN will be judged from how firmly Delhi now deals with a recalcitrant SL on the fishermen issue. SL has given TN/Delhi a foretaste of the Israeli style role it proposes to play in the region that Delhi’s continued appeasement of SL at the expense of TN sensitivities, threats to TN communities and assets and the Indian Union itself becomes meaningless.

 

  V S Subramaniam